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I. INTRODUCTION

Though at times a source of controversy, the American Law
Institute performs an enormous public service through its Restatement projects. One of the initial hurdles any such project confronts
is whether it should aim to clarify and illuminate the law, or to
push the law in a certain direction. I think the Restatement project
is most productive when it aims to clarify and illuminate rather
than guide or control the development of legal doctrine. Efforts to
guide and control risk producing questionable interpretations of the

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.

1413

1414

VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:3:1413

law, undermining the value of the Restatement in the long run.
Fortunately, the Restatement of Torts comes across largely as an
effort to clarify and illuminate.1
I will argue below that this clarification function can be improved by adopting, developing, and integrating a positive theoretical framework. A positive theory of tort doctrine can reveal connections between rules that initially seem initially to be unrelated,
suggest functions for rules that seem difficult to justify on doctrinal
grounds, help the researcher predict the eventual tort rules adopted
by courts in novel areas of the law, and give us greater confidence
in our interpretations of the case law. I hope to demonstrate that a
detailed positive framework can improve the Restatement and
similar efforts to clarify tort doctrine, and should be a central part
of the Restatement project.
In order to be useful to the Restatement project, a positive
theory of tort law has to have detailed implications for tort doctrine.
The lack of detailed implications and general failure to come to
grips with important features of tort doctrine have been substantial
shortcomings in the dominant positive framework, that of Holmes
and Posner. I extend the dominant framework below to enable it to
justify various intentional tort doctrines, and the specific form and
allocation of strict liability rules within tort law. After developing
the positive framework, I apply it to the Restatement (Third) of
Torts.2 The framework explains many of the detailed provisions and
commentary of the Restatement, and identifies one area in which
the Restatement (Third) seems inconsistent with tort doctrine. In
the penultimate section I return to the value of positive theory as a
part of the Restatement project.
II. THE NEED FOR A POSITIVE THEORY OF TORT DOCTRINE
It may seem a little odd to argue for the development of a
positive theory of tort doctrine after so much work in this vein has
been published. But the two most successful efforts to explain tort

1.
This is especially true in the hands of its highly regarded current Reporter Professor
Gary Schwartz.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Discussion Draft]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Prelimi-

nary Draft No. 2, May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 2]. Professor Schwartz
authored the Discussion Draft, and Professor Perlman authored Preliminary Draft No. 2. Unless
otherwise noted, "Restatement (Thirdy' refers to both the Discussion Draft and Preliminary Draft
No. 2.
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law, that of Holmes more than 100 years ago,3 and more recently
Posner, 4 are incomplete in important respects. Overall, I regard the
Holmes-Posner framework as a success, and like many scholars
continue to work largely within it. However, there are shortcomings
in the framework that limit its usefulness as a template for the detailed analysis of tort doctrine required by a project such as the Restatement.
Holmes provided the first positive economic theory of tort
law, anticipating the core as well as many important components of
Posner's account. Posner, in his seminal paper A Theory of Negligence, asserted that "Holmes left unclear what he conceived the
dominant purpose of the fault system to be, if it was not to compensate."5 This is nonsense. While Holmes did not have the advantage
of a century's worth of economic theory and associated technical
terminology to draw on, his consistent reliance on cost-benefit arguments clearly indicates that he thought tort doctrine aimed to
minimize the costs of accidents and accident avoidance. Holmes
6
claimed that tort doctrine generally accords with "convenience,"
which is about as close as one could come in the late 1800s to saying
"cost-minimization" or "economic efficiency," especially when addressing an audience comprised entirely of lawyers.
The core of Holmes' framework, as well as Posner's, is the
Hand formula for negligence. Under the Hand formula, an actor is
negligent, and therefore liable, if on the margin the cost of avoiding
the accident is less than the cost of the accident. Again, the fact
that Holmes did not use precisely this terminology is irrelevant,
because his arguments are so clearly consistent with this approach.
It is the habit of academics during a period of "normal science,"
when the stakes are high precisely because there is so little original
on the table, to make much of minor distinctions in terminology in
order to allocate credit. Put this habit aside for the moment and
imagine Holmes writing for a population of lawyers trained as they
are today, with a highly developed economics literature to consult.
Because Holmes believed that the Hand formula explained
so much of tort doctrine, he found little need for a concept such as

3.
I will refer to the chapters on tort law in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMiES, JR., THE COMMwON
LAW 77-163 (1881).
4.
I am referring to Richard Posner's many articles on the positive economic theory of tort
law, many of them co-authored with William Landes. The first article, and the one I wvill discuss
in this paper, is Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
5.
Id. at 31.
6.
HOLMES, supranote 3, at 1-2 The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly

corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient... f).
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duty.7 Indeed, Holmes makes no effort in The Common Law to explain the various duty doctrines, even though they probably were
more important in his day than in ours. Similarly, Holmes makes
little effort, beyond references to "policy coupled with tradition," 8 to
explain the function of strict liability. His brief references to strict
liability suggest that he believed the cost-internalization rationale
commonly advanced today was the purpose of strict liability, but
Holmes made no effort to get into the details of strict liability doctrines, such as nuisance law.
Posner, like Holmes, treats the Hand formula as the core of
tort doctrine, and similarly seems to have little use for the notion of
duty. However, the most significant shortcoming in Posner's
framework appears in his treatment of strict liability. Examine his
words from "A Theory of Negligence":
It is true that if you move from a regime where (say) railroads are strictly liable
for injuries inflicted in crossing accidents to one where they are liable only if neg-

ligent, the costs to the railroads of crossing accidents will be lower, and the output
of railroad services probably greater as a consequence. But it does not follow that
any subsidy is involved-unless it is proper usage to say that an industry is being

subsidized whenever a tax levied upon it is reduced or removed. As we shall see, a
negligence standard of liability, properly administered, is broadly consistent with
an optimum investment in accident prevention by the enterprises subject to the
9
standard.

Posner is suggesting in this quote, as he has said at other times, 10
that in the general context in which the negligence rule applies,
imposing strict liability- is equivalent to taxing the tortfeasor. The
reason is that the negligence standard is sufficient to induce the
actor to take cost-justified precautions. If the actor is strictly liable,
rather than liable only if negligent, he will not go beyond the reasonable level of precaution that he would choose under the negligence rule, which is the level that minimizes the sum of accident
and accident-avoidance costs. Put another way, the actor will not
spend $2 to avoid an expected liability of $1.
But a solid line of economic theory starting from Pigoul 1 and
receiving its most sophisticated applied treatment to the law by

7.
Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 6 Reporter's Note (citing Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The
Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660 (1873) (endorsing a general duty of "all the world to all
the world")).
8. HOLMES, supranote 3, at 155.
Posner, supra note 4, at 30.
9.
10. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAV 179 (4th ed. 1992).
11. See generally A.C. PIGoU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
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Calabresi 12 indicates that Posner's tax-subsidy argument is probably wrong. A railroad that exercises the reasonable level of precaution still lets off sparks that damage the crops of farmers. These
sparks are "external costs" or "externalities" associated with the
activity of running railroad cars. Under the theory of externalities,
optimum investment in the activity of running railroads is achieved
only if these external costs are internalized to the railroad owners.
Thus, as a general matter, strict liability is not an imposition that
serves no other purpose than to tax the railroad, even in settings in
which the courts adhere to the negligence rule. While the negligence rule ensures optimum investment in accident reduction,
strict liability ensures both optimum investment in accident reduction and activity levels.
We have a serious problem here. Under the positive framework that Posner has extended and developed, the general shape of
tort doctrine, with negligence serving as the default rule and strict
liability as the exception, appears wrongheaded. Economic theory
seems as a general matter to suggest that we should see strict liability as the general rule with negligence appearing as the exception in certain instances. Indeed, this basic insight motivated
Calabresi's impressive critique of the fault system. Calabresi,
working with the same advantages in scientific capital as Posner,
saw that the default rule suggested by the economic literature was
strict liability rather than negligence. Why the default rule should
be negligence remains unexplained under Posner's framework. This
is especially troubling for Posner's analysis because he, like
Holmes, treats the Hand formula as the theoretical core of tort doctrine.
The Posnerian extension of Holmes' framework runs into difficulties when confronting the doctrinal details of strict liability. In
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., Posner focused on one of six factors in the Restatement (Second) Section
520 test governing ultrahazardous activities: the inability to eliminate the risk of accident by the exercise of due care (factor (c)). 13
Elaborating, Posner said that
[s]ometimes ....
a particular type of accident cannot be prevented by taking care
but can be avoided, or its consequences minimized, by shifting the activity in

12. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACcIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
13. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176-81 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.).
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which the accident occurs to another locale, where the 4risk or harm of an accident
will be less.., or by reducing the scale of the activity.

Now, the problem with focusing on this element of Restatement
(Second) Section 520 is that this is always true of every accident
setting. We can never eliminate the risk of an accident, and we can
always avoid and minimize consequences by shifting and reducing
the activity. Posner's tendency to focus on the Hand formula leads
him to find only one reason to divert from the negligence standard,
and that is the case in which due care is insufficient to eliminate
accidents. But that is a troubling standard for strict liability because it is true in all cases. So we are still left searching for a reason to apply strict liability in one case rather than another.
I do not mean to argue that factor (c) of Restatement (Second)
Section 520 is useless. However, I do think that Section 520 has to
be regarded as a whole piece rather than reduced to one of its components. Moreover, of the components in Section 520, I find factor
(c) far from decisive in determining the appropriateness of strict
liability, and not very helpful standing alone. I will return to this
below.
A positive framework for tort doctrine should be able to explain tort doctrine at a rather detailed level. The best positive
framework available, that of Holmes as extended by Posner, has
several shortcomings. It has not been applied extensively or with
much success in explaining various duty doctrines in tort law. Nor
has it been applied to such "specific intent" torts as assault and
malicious prosecution. And it seems to do a poor job of explaining
the allocation of strict liability rules, and especially doctrine in the
closely related areas of nuisance and ultrahazardous activities. I
will set out an alternative that succeeds on these issues below.
III. EXTENDING THE POSITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR TORT
DOCTRINE

A richer positive theoretical framework begins with three observations, most of them anticipated in part either in Holmes' or in
Posner's analysis. First, as Holmes stressed in several instances, 15
tort law rules reflect statistical generalities, as one should expect of
default rules in general. Tort doctrine assumes individuals are
aware of basic physical laws, so that a driver who fails to brake in

14. Id. at 1177.
15. See, e.g., HoLMEs, supranote 3, at 155.
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time is assumed to have foreseen the likelihood of an accident.
Owners of tigers and bears are assumed to have foreseen the dangers they impose on others. A homeowner has the right to assume
that an individual who breaks into his house at night is there for a
bad purpose, and so on. Liability rules governing conduct, such as
negligence or strict liability, are typically based on statistical generalities concerning cause and effect.
Second, externalities are prevalent; they represent the norm
rather than the exception. I am referring both to negative externalities, costs imposed on others outside of an exchange setting, and to
positive externalities, or benefits conferred on others in the absence
of an exchange mediated through prices. Holmes signaled the importance of benefit externalization for understanding tort doctrine
when he noted that
[a] man need not, it is true, do this or that act-the term act implies a choice-but
he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously
no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon
the actor. 6

Third, liability rules affect activity level and care level decisions-a version of the standard distinction in economics between
substitution effects and scale effects. As Posner has made clear in
his discussions of the choice between strict liability and negligence,
strict liability gives actors incentives to shift the location or reduce
the scale of their activities. The negligence rule does not have this
effect because the actor is relieved of liability after taking reasonable precaution under the negligence rule. Because of the different
effect of strict liability, we should expect strict liability to be applied in tort law when a reduction in the actor's activity level is desirable. Contrary to Posner's assumption in Indiana Harbor, the
Hand formula does not tell us when this is the case.
One additional observation is that doctrinal rules achieve at
best a roughly optimal state. The tools provided by legal doctrine
are blunt. We should not expect them to bring about a "first-best"
outcome in which every actor has hit the optimal investment level
on every margin. For this reason the mathematical models currently employed in much of the law and economics literature are
often of only marginal relevance to tort doctrine, at least once we
hit a sufficient level of detail. The question of relevance is whether
the rule components (strict liability, negligence, intent, and so on)
provided in the doctrine have been put together in a way that
16. Id. at 95.
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minimizes the sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs relative
to some alternative configuration of the rule components. In general
(and as I will argue below), this appears to be true. And as a general rule, mathematical models may be helpful but are by no means
necessary in evaluating this question.
A. The Economics and Law of Activity Levels
With the foregoing as background, I will set out a modified
positive framework for tort doctrine, building on one I have referred
to before as the "missing markets" model. 17 For simplicity, let us
consider the choice between negligence and strict liability. If, assuming reasonable care, the externalized benefits are roughly equal
to the externalized costs connected with an activity, the negligence
rule should apply. The reason is that there is no economic case for
reducing the level of the activity in this setting. Since the external
benefits are roughly equal to the external costs, there is no net external (i.e., third party) harm on average associated with the actor's
activity when conducted reasonably. This is the context that includes most services provided in the market. For example, a bus
running down the street on which your business is located externalizes risk to you, to the extent the bus may veer off the road and
damage your store. On the other hand, the bus service also externalizes a benefit by bringing potential customers in contact with
your business. Alternatively, consider the risk externalization
among cars on a street. Each car, driven reasonably, externalizes
roughly the same risk to other cars. Under a negligence rule, there
is no net external harm imposed on a given actor when every actor
drives reasonably.
We can elaborate this argument by distinguishing private
and social benefits. Actors will pursue an activity up to the point
where the incremental private gain or benefit from the activity is
just equal to the incremental private cost. For example, a railroad
will run its trains until the marginal revenue from service is equal
to the marginal cost, for if the marginal revenue exceeds marginal
cost it will gain by increasing service. Society, on the other hand,
has an interest in seeing an activity expanded up to the point where
the marginal benefit to society (marginal social benefit) is just
equal to the marginal cost to society (marginal social cost). Suppose

17. See generally Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 977 (1996).
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the marginal revenue and marginal cost to the railroad are $10 per
passenger-mile (or freight-mile) at the firm's privately optimal level
of service. Suppose that the external harm to farmers is $10 (per
passenger-mile), and the external benefit to farmers is $10. Since
the marginal social benefit is $20 and the marginal social cost is
$20, there is no economic argument for reducing the scale of the
railroad's activity.
If, when railroads are operated with reasonable care, the externalized costs are substantially greater than externalized benefits, then a strict liability rule is appropriate against the actor responsible for the costs. Suppose the external cost to farmers from
the railroad is $110 per passenger-mile and the external benefit to
them is $10 per passenger-mile. At the railroad's preferred level of
service, the marginal social cost of rail service is $120 (the sum of
$110 external and $10 private), while the marginal social benefit is
only $20. Every additional mile of service reduces society's wealth
by at least $100. In this case, reducing the scale of rail service enhances society's wealth. By internalizing the $110 to the railroad, a
strict liability rule would induce the railroad to choose a lower level
of service where marginal revenue is commensurately high. The
new privately optimal level of service for the railroad may be one
where the railroad's marginal cost is $112 and the railroad's marginal revenue is also $112.18 See Figure 1.

18. Alternatively, if railroad cost curves are downward-sloping, the new privately optimal
service level may be more costly at the margin. For example, the new privately optimal service

level may be one where the marginal social cost is S130 and the marginal revenue is also $130.
For the purpose of this discussion it does not matter whether the railroad's cost curves are upward or downward-sloping. The important point is that when external costs are "internalized ,"
which is what we observe under strict liability, the railroad's service level declines.
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Figure 1
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- - - - - - - - -
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marginalprivate benefit
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The railroad's preferred activity level under strict liability,
point B in Figure 1, is not the same as society's best service level,
which is point C. However, the railroad's preferred service level under strict liability is better, from society's perspective, than its preferred service level under negligence (point A). This serves to illustrate the point that liability rules do not necessarily achieve the
optimal outcome, as defined within economic models. The optimal
outcome would equate the marginal social cost of service with its
marginal social benefit. But this is beyond the power of liability
rules in many instances. The relevant question is whether strict
liability comes closer to bringing about socially optimal activity levels than does negligence.
From the foregoing it should be clear that strict liability is
socially preferable to negligence whenever the external costs are
substantially larger than external benefits. When the ratio of external costs to external benefits is roughly one, the negligence rule
is preferable to strict liability. When the ratio is substantially
greater than one, strict liability is preferable to negligence. When
the ratio is substantially less than one, courts should choose liabil-
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ity rules that serve in effect to subsidize the underlying activity, by
reducing the actor's expected liability below what he would bear
under the negligence rule. I will argue below that tort doctrine is
consistent with these general principles, and that they help us understand many of the details of the intentional tort and of strict liability doctrines.
B. Some Immediate Applications
To begin, we hardly ever observe any tort rules that really
can be described as strict liability, in the sense that the potential
defendant acts at his peril. Perhaps the closest version of such a
rule is observed in products liability doctrine, in the case of manufacturing defects. The Restatement (Second) Section 402A holds the
manufacturer liable for manufacturing defects without regard to his
level of care or his activity level.' 9 However, outside of this rather
special case, I am aware of no others of such pure strict liability.
Instead, we observe rules that do not inquire into the fault of the
defendant, but do inquire into several other issues. For example,
consider Restatement (Second) Section 520, governing ultrahazardous activities. 20 Although Posner focused on only one of those factors in Indiana Harbor,there are six factors altogether in Section
520.21 Similarly, nuisance doctrine examines a broad range of issues
outside of the defendant's fault. What explains the structure of the
strict liability doctrines we observe in tort law?
The strict liability doctrines we observe in tort law aim to
guide courts in assessing whether the ratio of externalized costs to
externalized benefits is substantially greater than one. This explains why we see rather complicated rules for the most part under
areas of law bearing the label "strict liability," and why the simple
"pure strict liability" rule governing manufacturing defects is a
unique and special case. This also explains why Posner's reduction,
in Indiana Harbor, of Restatement (Second) Section 520 to a single
factor-whether the danger can be eliminated with reasonable
care-is probably unwise and almost certainly inconsistent with
tort doctrine. The Hand formula approach advanced by Posner is
insufficient to explain the structure of strict liability rules.
We can think of tort law as consisting of rules with three liability-allocating functions. First, there is the Hand formula, which,

19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 cmt. a (19G5).
20. See infra Part IV.D.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
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as Holmes and Posner have stressed, is properly viewed as the general default rule for tort liability. Second, there are channeling
rules that allocated more or less liability than required by the Hand
rule. Strict liability doctrine can be put in this category, and so can
rules governing duty and proximate cause. These rules, as noted
earlier, are based on statistical generalities. Third, there are inference rules that serve generally to minimize the likelihood of an erroneous decision. In this category fall such seemingly unrelated
doctrines as res ipsa loquitur and rules governing application of the
reasonable person test (e.g., to the insane, to those with disabilities,
etc.). This is a somewhat arbitrary categorization, since I could
have just as well said that every legal rule aims to minimize the
expected costs of legal errors. However, rather than approach every
legal doctrine as an inference rule, I have begun this discussion by
analyzing the welfare implications of alternative liability rules
(strict liability and negligence). To remain consistent with this approach, I will treat the inference problem within a relatively narrow
scope.
Armed with the framework presented above and these functional categories, I think one can march through much of the Restatement (Second or Third), finding along the way better explanations for some of the doctrines and connections between seemingly
unrelated rules. Indeed, one could use the framework to reorder the
doctrines according to functional rather than formal legal categories. More important, the framework is capable of revealing areas
in which the Restatement fails to clarify tort doctrine. I will follow
the general outline of the Restatement (Third) draft while sparing
the reader of all of the details.
IV. POSITIvE THEORY AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
A. Intentional Torts
Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft) ("Discussion Draft") Section I tells us that an "actor's causation of harm is intentional if the actor brings about that
harm either purposefully or knowingly." 22 Since we cannot know
with certainty whether another person has acted "purposefully or
knowingly," the determination of intent is a matter of inference.

22. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 1.
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Proof of purposeful or knowing conduct must, as Holmes stressed,2
hinge on whether the facts are such that a reasonable person would
have known that his conduct would lead to harm, or that the probability of harm flowing from his conduct was very high. Viewed in
this way, the determination of intent is not very different from the
determination of negligence. Since defendants will not walk into
court and admit intent or negligence, both require proof of facts
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant
acted under the requisite mental state.
The Discussion Draft provides in the Comment to Section 1
that the "concept of intent is rendered important by the presence of
a general rule . . .that imposes liability on defendants who intentionally cause physical harm."24 In other words, intentional harms
often give rise to strict liability. The interesting question is why.
The notion that intent is just an advanced or more pernicious form
of fault seems inadequate. There are important instances in which
an actor can harm another intentionally without having to worry
about strict liability. For example, if I open up a convenience store
next door to yours and sell the same goods for one dollar less, I
must know that I will put you out of business. But I will not be held
strictly liable for your loss, and probably not liable at all. Moreover,
the intent cases reveal two levels of intent: "general intent," or intent to carry out the act, and "specific intent," or intent to harm.
Only the former level of intent is required in most cases, which
suggests that intent is generally no more pernicious as a form of
fault than negligence.
The liability rules governing intentional conduct serve as examples of channeling rules designed to reduce the scale of certain
activities. For those activities for which the ratio of externalized
costs to externalized benefits is greater than one, intentional conduct generally gives rise to strict liability. Another distinction to
incorporate in this set of cases is that between high and low transaction cost settings. Harmful expropriations in low transaction cost
settings should be taxed in order to discourage efforts to evade the
market. Most examples of intentional torts giving rise to strict li25
ability fall under these categories.
Consider examples 2 and 3, from the Discussion Draft:

23. HOLIES,supra note 3, at 147-49.
24. Discussion Draft, supranote 2, § 1 cmt a.
25. That is, they involve cases in which the ratio of externalized costs to benefits is high and

transaction costs are low (e.g., most trespasses), or the ratio of externalized costs to benefits is
high and transaction costs are high (e.g., nuisances). See Hylton, supra note 17, at 993.
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Wendy throws a rock at Bill, someone she dislikes, at a distance of 100 feet,
wanting to hit Bill.... Wendy's aim is true, and Bill is struck by the rock....
The Jones Company runs an aluminum smelter, which emits particulate fluorides
as part of the industrial process. From an early date Jones knows that these particles, carried by the air, will land on neighboring property, and in doing so will
bring about a range of harms. 2

In both examples the externalized costs of the activity,
viewed generally, exceed externalized benefits by a substantial
margin. In such cases strict liability acts as a corrective pricing
mechanism, inducing actors to take into account the expected costs
of their activity to others. Although the assumption of rational accounting may appear strained in the case of Wendy, the strict liability rules will most likely lead the Jones Company to scale back
its activity to a level where the marginal benefit to Jones is equal to
the marginal social cost of the activity.
The typical case of trespass-Bill wanders on to Joe's property and removes the shutters from his house-falls within this
analysis. If the victim has a substantial damage claim, the cost of
the defendant's activity to him probably outweighs its benefits.
Moreover, trespass doctrine is designed to induce actors to use the
market in settings where transaction costs are low. The more extreme case of an actor who trespasses with an intent to harm-Bill
wanders on to Joe's property to throw rocks through his windowsis also easily in the same category. In the more extreme case of trespass with intent to harm, it is clear that as a general matter, net
external costs of the activity are substantial and the actor should be
encouraged to bargain for his desired result. Courts often award
punitive damages in these cases because they recognize that simply
internalizing costs may not be enough; it is better to eliminate the
activity entirely, which is the goal of overlapping criminal prohibi27
tions.
The Comment to Section 1 notes, without attempting to explain, several features of intentional tort doctrine that seem inconsistent with the broader scheme of intentional tort doctrine or tort
doctrine in other areas. The framework of this Paper easily explains
these features. For example, consider the various doctrines requiring proof of more than an intent to bring about harm, the trans-

26. Discussion Draft, supranote 2, § 1 cmt. d, illus. 2-3.
27. See generally Keith N. Hylton, PunitiveDamagesand The Economic Theory of Penalties,
87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998).
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ferred intent rule, and the subordination of traditional negligence
defenses under intentional tort doctrine.
For several intentional torts, intent to bring about the harm
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for liability. Consider the
torts of assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss
of prospective economic advantage. Although the details of the rules
differ in each case, each tort requires the plaintiff to prove a higher
level of intent than merely intent to carry out the act leading to the
harm. For example, assault doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant intended to harm or create the impression of
impending harm. This goes beyond the trespass and battery rules,
which require proof merely that the defendant intended to carry out
his conduct.
I think it is not hard to show that each one of the torts requiring proof of more than general intent essentially requires proof
of specific intent, or intent to harm. This is obvious in the case of
assault. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous."2 No
one has a good legal definition of outrageousness, but the purpose of
the requirement is to distinguish ordinary insults from expression
that would create significant distress in the average person. Such
expression, it is reasonable to infer, must have been uttered with
an intent to harm the listener. I could continue through the other
torts in this category-e.g., malicious prosecution, interference with
prospective economic advantage, and others-but in each case I am
sure the argument would be the same, that the doctrine essentially
requires proof of specific intent to harm.
Why does the law governing assault, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and interference with prospective advantage
require proof of specific intent to harm? The reason is that as a
general rule the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits
is less than one for these activities. Each involves a substantial intermingling of possibly harmful with beneficial activity. Assault
cases, and those involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, often involve aspects of expression. As an activity, expression
typically provides substantial external benefits. As John Stuart
Mill argued, free expression enables the correction of false beliefs.2
From a better known economic perspective, expression is a public
good in the sense that it can provide the same benefits to numerous

28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 (1965).

29. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing 1978)
(1859).
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consumers.30 Most economics textbooks explain that public goods
should be subsidized, which is what the law does in effect by requiring plaintiffs to prove specific intent to harm.
Transferred intent doctrine makes obvious sense once we
view strict liability as controlling activity levels. It does not matter
whether Wendy aimed to hit Bill or Joe with a rock. The transferred intent doctrine guarantees that Wendy will pay for the harm
regardless of the identity of the intended victim. The aim is not to
punish Wendy for desiring to hit Bill with a rock, but to give Wendy
an incentive to "price out" her own potentially harmful conduct before acting.
The subordination of traditional defenses, such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence, is also easy to understand
when strict liability is viewed as a rule designed to channel liability
toward activities that externalize far more costs than benefits, or
far more costs than most activities. To allow a contributory negligence or assumption of risk defense for battery would relieve batterers of part of the cost of their activity, a partial subsidy. But
there is no good argument for subsidizing battery. Where the harms
outweigh the benefits, we should regulate the activity by making
the actor pay the full costs. Even when the foreseeable harms are
relatively small, we still want the actor to face the risk of paying
the full costs, so that he understands that he should seek a consensual transaction from the victim.
B. Negligence
Since the Discussion Draft tells us that the balancing test or
Hand formula is clearly the dominant method of determining negligence, 31 the main issue of interest is how one goes about inferring
negligence. The balancing test balances the burden of precaution
against the incremental expected harms in the absence of precaution. As Learned Hand put it, the balancing test compares B with
PL, where B is the burden of precaution and PL is the (incremental)
probability of harm (P) multiplied by the harm (L).
There are, to be sure, several special tort doctrines that follow more or less directly from the balancing test. The "emergency
rule" of Discussion Draft Section 7 recognizes that in emergencies
the actor may be especially prone to make mistakes in attempting

30. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 297-98 (1981).
31. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. d.
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to comply with the reasonable care standard, since an actor in an
emergency may be too frightened or distracted to make roughly accurate guesses as to the magnitudes of B and PL. The rules governing the negligence of children also follow directly from the BPL
test. Ordinarily, a child is held to the standard of a reasonably careful child of the same age, experience, and intelligence. This implies
that adults must take extra care to avoid injuring a child, which
follows from the balancing test because even when children are
acting reasonably (given their capacities) the risk of injury (PL) is
higher than in a setting with only adults. Since adults can observe
and predict the harms associated with this higher level of risk, they
must adjust their levels of care upward. Adults are relieved of this
responsibility when children are engaged in adult activities, for in
such cases adults generally cannot observe the higher level of risk.
Most adults will assume that actors engaged in adult activities,
such as driving, are adults.
The balancing test is conducted from the perspective of the
reasonable man. This forces a statistical averaging or objective approach to inferring negligence. There are several implications of
this approach noted in the literature. Holmes, as usual the first to
come to this issue, noted that the negligence test makes no special
allowances for the awkward; the test "does not attempt to see men
as God sees them." 32 People who have trouble complying with the
conduct of the reasonable person, for unobservable reasons, are in
effect subjected to strict liability. Holmes saw this problem as exposing a fundamental weakness in claims that negligence doctrine
is consistent with moral theory. Mark Grady, more recently, has
argued that the negligence test operates in effect as a strict liability
rule in cases involving nondurable precaution.3 3 The reason is that
people simply cannot be careful all of the time. Someone will slip up
eventually, and competition will force you to take on some risk of
error. While Holmes envisioned negligence falling unfairly across a
population of different actors with randomly distributed abilities,
Grady envisions the negligence rule falling unfairly over time
against a single actor as he passes through random realizations of
his own ability levels. The averaging under the balancing test also
excludes certain desires or objectives, 34 such as those of the motor-

32. HOLIES, supranote 3, at 108.
33. See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887,
909-12 (1994).

34. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 Reporter's Note (citing Gregory C. Keating. Reasonablenessand Rationalityin Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L REV. 311, 369 (1996)).
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ist who likes to race, which some regard as supporting the moral
theory of negligence doctrine. I might add to this the case in which
the negligence rule fails to consider the ephemeral benefits or desires of the average actor, perhaps as another point on the side of
the moral vision.
The reasonable person test should be viewed as an inference
rule, having nothing to do with the morality issue. The BPL test
involves some components that are either unobservable or imperfectly observable to jurors. The most important one is the defendant's burden of precaution, B. The jury cannot observe this quantity, and the defendant has every incentive to assert that it is extremely high. The jury does observe the general population distribution of B. Hence, in a rational inference system, the jury should
tend to put a great deal of weight on the average drawn from the
general distribution, unless the defendant can offer concrete proof
that his burden of precaution is far above the average. It follows
immediately from this that rules excluding unprovable claims of
unusual awkwardness or unusual desires would be a part of the
balancing test. The reasonable person test incorporates such rules.
It is hard to distinguish how such a rational inference system would differ from one in which there is an alleged "hindsight
bias. ''3 5 Hindsight bias apparently occurs because people think
things are more likely to happen once they happen. While that is
true, the difficult part is determining whether this should be labeled as a bias. Bayesians will update their predictions of the probability an event will happen after it happens.3 6 This much of hindsight judgment is entirely rational and should not be treated as a
type of cognitive bias. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to design a
test that would distinguish Bayesian updating from an alleged
hindsight bias. To this we should add the strategic problem referred
to above: that juries must discount claims by the defendant that the
probability of harm is extremely low, because they know that the
defendant's incentive is to lie. A rational jury will therefore put a
great deal of weight on the Bayesian adjusted estimate of P rather
than the defendant's evidence of P.
The class of inference rules also includes doctrines governing
unreasonable conduct due to mental or emotional disability. Dis-

35. See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex Ante: DeterminingLiability in
Hindsight, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 90-94, 99-102 (1995) (discussing "hindsight bias" and how
it affects jurors in negligence cases).
36. For a discussion of Bayes' Theorem and its implications for law, see Laurence H. Tribo,
Trial by Mathematics, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1351-58 (1971).
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cussion Draft Section 9c says that "[u]nless the actor is a child, the
actor's mental or emotional disability is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent." The rationale follows from
the foregoing argument. It is very hard to tell whether someone is
too emotionally unstable or unintelligent to comply with the reasonable care standard. Even if such a defense were permitted, juries would discount defendants' attempts to use it after its abuse
7
became common knowledge. The defendant in Vaughan v. Menloue3
argued that the reasonable care standard is unfair and unpredictable from the perspective of an actor who is mentally incapable of
complying. However, the uncertainty problem would be considerably worse if the disability defense were allowed. If juries did not
discount the defense entirely, the reasonable care standard would
become too uncertain to serve as a constraint on conduct.
C. Duty
The Discussion Draft takes a rather vague and uncommitted
stance on the duty issue. Discussion Draft Section 6 says explicitly
that "[f]indings of no duty are unusual, and are based on judicial
recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify the
withholding of liability."38 We are told in Comments c and d of areas
of the case law in which the duty issue seems to be an appropriate
area of concern. However, there is no discussion of underlying principles. The Reporter's Note buries the duty issue even further, noting that "[m]odern scholars tend to classify the issue of the foresee" 39
able plaintiff under the general heading of proximate causation.
The Discussion Draft's treatment of duty illustrates the need
for further development of the positive framework for tort doctrine
and integration of that framework into the Restatement project.
The duty doctrines are examples of channeling rules that allocate
liability largely in response to activity level concerns. For example,
consider the general rule that a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser, save that of intentionally or recklessly harming him. This
rule is simply a complement of the strict liability rule imposed on
trespassers. The strict liability rule deters or reduces the scale of
trespassing as an activity. In order to accomplish this function, the
rule must be joined by a complementary rule relieving the landowner of a duty to provide and care for the trespasser. This is the

37. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
38. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 6.
39. Id. § 6 Reporter's Note.
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policy underlying the rule that a landowner has no duty to a trespasser. Consider
the general rule that there is
no duty to rescue.
There are so many exceptions to this rule that one can fairly doubt
whether there is any substance to the general rule at all. However,
the rescue doctrine should be viewed as a rule that channels tort
liability away from actors whose activities are not causally or probabilistically related to the victim's harm. Generally, tort law imposes negligence liability only on those actors who should have
foreseen the victim's harm as a likely consequence of their activity.
This is not the case in the rescue settings where no duty is found. A
person reading a book on a beach does not foresee another person
drowning as a result of his activity.
Now one could argue that a duty to rescue would force the
man on the beach to foresee the possible drowning accidents around
him. But this would require him to be aware and prepared to react
to the drowning risk at all times. Since the cost of complying with
this expectation is so high, many potential rescuers would avoid the
risk altogether and stay home. Thus, as Landes and Posner recognized, the essential rationale for the rescue doctrine is based on its
40
activity level effects.
Many scholars and courts treat duty issues as part of the
proximate cause question today. This is a sensible approach, given
that the function of proximate cause is to channel liability away
from actors engaged in activities that are not causally or probabilistically related to the victim's harm. However, this is an approach
that creates some losses in doctrinal clarity. If channeling issues
are dealt with as matters of duty, then they are matters of law,
which courts will treat as important precedents. If, on the other
hand, they are treated as matters of proximate cause, then they are
primarily questions for the jury. As jury questions, they fail to create important rules to guide future courts.
The question whether channeling issues should be dealt with
under proximate cause or duty doctrine returns us to one of the important functions of inference rules. Inference rules provide predictability and stability to the law by preventing courts from giving

40. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 99 (1978); see
also Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 198-99 (1973) (noting

difficulty of distinguishing easy, or cost-justified, rescue situations from difficult rescue situations). Given the high risk of error in any attempt to apply a negligence rule to rescue attempts,
the effect of a negligence rule should be equivalent to that of a strict liability rule.
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weight to unverifiable defenses. Duty rules, in addition to serving
the channeling function spelled out here, also serve the same function as inference rules, when compared to the alternative of proximate cause analysis. Duty rules are to some extent preferable to
proximate cause rules, because they contribute to the predictability
of legal doctrine. And if actors are supposed to comply with the tort
rules, the courts should be aiming to state them with some degree
of clarity. Thus, it should not be regarded as a matter of indifference whether questions of duty are dealt with as "duty rules" or as
proximate cause rules. The more consistent and reliable duty doctrines (e.g., no duty to a trespasser) should be analyzed by courts
under the heading of duty rather than proximate cause.
D. Strict Liability
Tort law includes several forms of liability labeled strict: liability for animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, producer liability, vicarious liability. However, not all of these versions
share similar doctrinal features. The first three have similar doctrines, and fall under the framework of this paper. Products liability includes two components referred to as strict liability: liability
for manufacturing defects, and liability for defective designs. Liability for manufacturing defects is perhaps the only example in
tort law of pure strict liability, in the sense that an injury caused by
a manufacturing defect leads directly to liability. Design defect doctrine, though labeled strict liability, actually applies a type of negligence test to the design decision. Vicarious liability, as the Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Preliminary Draft
No. 2) ("Preliminary Draft No. 2") Comment notes, requires proof of
4
negligence against the agent. '
I will focus here on liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Preliminary Draft No. 2 Section 21 defines an abnormally dangerous activity as follows: (1) The activity creates a foreseeable and
highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care
is exercised by all actors; and (2) the activity is not a matter of
common usage. Restatement (Second) Section 520 defines an abnormally dangerous activity by the following six factors: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to

41.

Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 18 cmt. a.
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which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f)
extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
As between the two Restatement definitions, I find the Restatement (Second) Section 520 more informative and more consistent with the framework of this paper. The first three factors of Restatement (Second) Section 520 have been simplified and squeezed
into the first factor of Preliminary Draft No. 2 Section 21 without
losing any significant parts. The first three factors signal the importance of residual risk in strict liability doctrine, i.e., the risk
that remains once all actors are taking reasonable care. Strict liability doctrine, under the framework presented here, is largely
concerned with correcting substantial imbalances in the exchange
of residual harms. If the residual risk is not "highly significant,"
then strict liability is probably not appropriate. The last three factors of Restatement (Second) Section 520 are not really captured by
the second factor of Preliminary Draft No. 2 Section 21. Preliminary
Draft No. 2 Section 21 refers only to the common usage issue,
whereas the last three factors of Restatement (Second) Section 520
refer to common usage and the extent to which there is some reciprocity in the exchange of residual risks and benefits among adjacent activities.
Restatement (Second) Section 520 lays out a test that seems
to guide courts in assessing the ratio of externalized costs and benefits, which is the general form of strict liability test suggested by
the missing-markets framework of this paper. The first three requirements establish a threshold requirement that the residual risk
(i.e., the risk externalized when actors are taking reasonable care)
is substantial. The last three follow on with an important part of
the test. If all of the last three factors are satisfied, we generally
can be sure that there is a non-reciprocal exchange of risks between
the defendant's activity and others, or that the defendant's activity
externalizes far more risk than benefit. Given this, it is appropriate
to tax the activity with strict liability, in order to give the actor an
incentive to reduce its scale closer to the optimal level (return to
Figure 1) or to shift the activity to a different locale.
The positive framework of this Paper suggests that the more
detailed test set out in Section 520 is superior to that in Section 21.
Section 21's reference to common usage does not guide the court
toward making an effort to examine the degree of reciprocity in the
exchange of residual risks. Usually, if an activity is one of common
usage there will be a roughly reciprocal exchange of residual risks.
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However, this may not always be the case. For example, the water
reservoir in Rylands v. Fletcher 2 may have been a relatively common, or at least not uncommon, feature in England during the
1800s. 43 It would be easy to reach the conclusion that a reservoir
externalizes far more non-reciprocated risk than benefit onto adjacent activities.M However, it might have been difficult to say
whether the reservoir was a matter of common usage. It is troubling to find that the most recent Restatement effort to codify the
Rylands doctrine might have led to a different result if applied in
the Rylands case.
This criticism applies with greater force to Posner's reduction, in Indiana Harbor, of Section 520 to a single factor-whether
the harm can be eliminated by reasonable care. If one were to apply
this factor alone to the Rylands case, one might conclude that strict
liability is inappropriate in that setting. After all, it would be a bit
much to ask a reservoir owner to move it to another location, and it
is hard to see how he could reduce the scale of his activity. Since
the activity level responses induced by strict liability are minimal
in the short run, and the harm in Rylands might have been reduced
substantially through additional care, Posner's test could easily
lead to a different result in the Rylands case.
In addition to suggesting that Section 520 is superior to Section 21 as a codification of Rylands doctrine, the theory of this Paper provides a better explanation of Rylands, and its place in the
broader scheme of tort doctrine, than any other theory of which I
am aware. The various opinions in the Rylands litigation make no
reference to whether the defendant's reservoir was a matter of
common usage. However, the opinions do stress the inequitable exchange of residual risks in Rylands and similar cases. Consider
Justice Blackburn's opinion in the first appeal:
The general rule ..

seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is

eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by

water from his neighbor's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by filth of his
neighbor's privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome
vapors of his neighbor's alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own;

and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so
long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if

42. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868).
43. A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liabilityfor BurstingReservoirs, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216-17
(1984).

44. Id. at 218-19 (noting that dam failures were major disasters); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 129 (6th ed. 1995).
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it gets on his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the
damage which en45
sues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property.

Virtually all of the examples discussed in the Rylands opinionscattle, fumes, and water-were most likely matters of common
usage at the time. The judges in Rylands seemed to be concerned
primarily with the inequitable allocation of residual risk.
Of the other theories available, Fletcher's reciprocal risk
theory seems to also provide a good explanation of the Rylands doctrine. 46 According to Fletcher, tort liability is based largely on
whether the exchange of risk between two actors can be regarded as
reciprocal or roughly equal. Where the exchange is roughly equal,
the negligence rule applies; where the exchange is unequal, strict
liability applies to the actor who externalizes the most risk. This
theory has an appealing simplicity and seems to explain the Rylands case. However, Fletcher's theory lacks a solid theoretical
foundation, a problem that becomes obvious the moment you ask
why reciprocal risk-exchange should matter. Moreover, because it
lacks a good theoretical foundation, it is inadequate, without a good
deal of extra work, to explain many of the simplest negligence
cases. For example, medical malpractice cases involve a doctor, who
throws a lot of risk onto a patient, who in turn throws virtually no
risk onto the doctor. The negligence rule applies, even though there
is an obvious imbalance in the exchange of residual risks.
Having mentioned animals in the course of discussing the
Rylands doctrine, I see little need here to explore in detail the implications of this Paper's framework for the Restatement provisions
on liability for animals. Strict liability applies because of the inequitable exchange of residual risks. On the basis of this theory, it
seems clear that the provisions regarding liability for animals can
be treated as a special case of the Rylands doctrine. This is as it
should be, since the Rylands opinions mention animals to illustrate
the general argument for strict liability.
V. RETURNING TO THE RESTATEMENT'S PURPOSE
The payoff from an extended positive framework is that it
explains tort doctrine in detail, and suggests functional similarities
among tort rules. The framework presented here solves the most

45.

Rylands, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (Blackburn, J.).

46. George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 544.45
(1972).
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important puzzle generated under the Holmes-Posner framework:
the prevalence of the negligence rule. The framework also explains
the doctrine governing "specific intent" (intent-to-harm) torts such
as assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the importance of the distinction between general and specific intent
torts, and its implications for punitive damages; the function, as
well as the relative merits, of duty and proximate cause rules; and
the specific contours of strict liability doctrines. These are all areas
of tort doctrine that are either unexplained or insufficiently explained under the Holmes-Posner framework. The framework of
this Paper also extends our understanding of the reasonable-person
standard and functionally related rules.
A detailed positive theoretical framework is useful to the Restatement project in explaining rules, ordering them by function,
and avoiding mistakes in interpretation. There is always a choice in
any project such as the Restatement whether to lay out the rules
according to formal legal categories or to lay them out according to
some notion of their functions. Since the Restatement of Torts has
traditionally been laid out according to formal legal categories (intent, negligence, etc.), revisions should continue with this format.
However, a better sense of the functional similarities among rules
should enhance efforts to clarify by reducing the fragmentation or
diffusion of legal concepts. It also helps avoid revising in the wrong
direction.
I think the framework here itself makes a case for incorporating positive theory as a central part of the Restatement project.
The law changes over time, in response to changes in technology
and preferences. It is important, in view of its fluidity, to get a
glimpse of the underlying skeletal structure of legal doctrine, which
is what positive theory aims to do. Of course, Langdell thought he
was getting at the skeleton of the law too, but there is a big difference between positive theory, as understood today, and the Langdellian project. While the Langdellian approach aims to discover a
core set of fundamental legal rules, which is a doubtful exercise, the
positive theory approach aims to discover the functions of legal
rules, and to work backwards toward a deeper understanding of
rules from an understanding of their functions. The relative merits
of these two approaches have been revealed over the past century.
While the Langdellian approach has yielded no useful insights into
tort doctrine, the positive theory approach, begun with Holmes' decision to break from the Langdellian mold, has given us an enormously useful framework for understanding tort doctrine.
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Moreover, positive theory constrains "restaters" (everyone

involved in the Restatement project) of the law in a manner that
enhances the value of the Restatement. It is much harder to push
the law in a novel, unwarranted direction when one is also constrained to remain consistent with a broader theoretical framework.
This enhances the long-term value of the Restatement by dampening opportunities to use it as a launching pad for legal reform efforts. This, in turn, benefits "restaters" by reducing incentives for
legal pressure groups to insert themselves into the Restatement
project. 47

VI. CONCLUSION

The positive tort theory framework of Holmes and Posner is
largely successful, though lacking sufficient detail to explain many
tort doctrines. I have extended the framework here and applied it to
the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The extended framework explains
tort doctrine at a highly detailed level, which is important if positive theory is to be useful to the Restatement project.

47. Of course, one approach to this problem is to always have highly.respected Reporters of
the caliber of Professor Schwartz, in order to discourage pressure group efforts. But I would
prefer to design a system that minimizes the risk of pressure group influence.

